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THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF PRINTED
SYSTEMSt
DALE P. OLSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
During most of the nineteenth century, courts were hostile to
the idea of allowing copyright protection for material that was
commercial rather than literary in nature, finding commercial
material either not to be within the statutory classifications of the
copyright acts or not to contain sufficient originality to be constitu-
tionally protected.' Although most printed material, regardless of
its literary merit, is now copyrightable, 2 one important case, Baker
v. Selden, decided in that era of judicial hostility remains viable
and perplexing even in the wake of the comprehensive review of
copyright law that resulted in the Copyright Act of 1976.
Baker v. Selden3 dealt with the alleged infringement of a book
explaining and demonstrating a bookkeeping system. From that
case emerged a rule that has retained its viability for more than a
century: a printed system is not subject to copyright protection. As
a limitation on the scope or subject matter of copyright, the deci-
t Copyright 1979 by Dale P. Olson.
* Assistant Professor of Law, West Virginia University, College of Law; B.A.,
1969 and J.D., 1972, University of Minnesota; LL.M., 1976, Yale University. The
author is grateful for the grant he received from the Arthur Hodges Trust Fund to
support the research and writing of this article.
See notes 18-22 infra and accompanying text.
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251-52 (1903);
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884). All material
to be copyrighted must meet the constitutional and statutory provisions for origi-
nality. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C.A. § 102(a) (1976) [hereinafter cited
as the Copyright Act of 19761. Section 102(a) provides that the subject matter of
copyright can be found "in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression." The term "original works of authorship" was deliberately left
undefined, and was intended to incorporate the judicially established standard of
originality under the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909)
[hereinafter cited as the 1909 Act]. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57,
reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5659, 5670.
Although material which is created by an author's independent effort meets
the originality requirement, e.g. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc.
v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1163 n.5 (9th Cir. 1977), in order to invest
protection in a work which is a variation on material in the public domain, the
changes made must be more than trivial. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Vogue Ring Creations,
Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609 (D.R.I. 1976). See notes 30-72 infra and accom-
panying text.
101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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sion has been adopted to varying degrees by subsequent decisions,,
Regulations of the Copyright Office,' and the Copyright Act of
1976.6 But the holding of the Court in Baker is problematical even
in the context of the bookkeeping system the Court was reviewing.
Using three distinct and inconsistent approaches, the Court held
that the complaint alleging infringement of the plaintiff's book-
keeping system must be dismissed. While the reasoning of the
Baker court is subject to critical attack on several grounds,7 its
holding seems correct. Because the plaintiff was attempting to
obtain copyright on what was clearly an idea-the display on fac-
ing pages of accounting results for a given time period-the case
falls within the unimpeachable copyright rule that only the expres-
sion of an idea, and not the idea itself, is subject to protection.'
Were the case authority for only that proposition no problem
would arise. But Baker v. Selden has been applied in a number of
contexts remote from the facts of the case and used to support
exclusion from copyright protection of a wide variety of materials
characterized as printed systems. Printed systems are properties
sharing several elements which made courts uncomfortable; that
discomfort often causes a judicial response (relying on Baker v.
Seldon) that the material is outside of the scope of copyright.'
Among these disquieting factors is that printed systems rely on the
See text § II(B) of this article.
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(b) (1977) provides that "[ildeas, plans, methods, systems,
or devices, as distinguished from the particular manner in which they are expressed
or described in a writing," are not material subject to copyright.
6 Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, at § 102(a). Section 102(b) of the Act
provides that "[uln no case does copyright protection for an original work of au-
thorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, con-
cept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work." The section was drafted to codify
the case law on the scope of copyright protection. The House Report accompanying
the final version of the Copyright Act of 1976 states that the purpose of § 102(b)
was "to restate, in the context of the new single Federal system of copyright, that
the basic dichotomy between expression and idea remains unchanged." H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 5659, 5670.
Although both § 102(b) and § 133(b) of the 1976 Copyright Act refer to aspects
of the issues protected by the case, "[t]he full Baker v. Selden doctrine . . . is
neither accepted nor rejected by the Act. Its application is rather left to the courts."
M. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.18[B] n.15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
NIMMER].
See part II of this article.
See note 75 infra.
See notes 141-57 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 81
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PROTECTING PRINTED SYSTEMS
interrelationship of elements for their value. Simply protecting the
textual explanation of a shorthand system, for example, would not
protect the shorthand symbols themselves. Neither does protection
of the interrelated elements fall within the comfortable limits of
protecting expression of an idea as opposed to the idea itself. Since
the elements are intended to be used actively, a printed system
falls within a class of subject matter where distinguishing expres-
sion from idea is difficult.
A high degree of responsibility for this difficulty lies with the
Court's opinion in Baker v. Selden and cases adhering to it, be-
cause of the breadth of the Court's holding, the inconsistent ration-
ale on which the Court relied, and the Court's failure to segregate
the protected from the unprotected elements in the bookkeeping
system examined in the case. Baker v. Selden has also had an
impact outside of the copyright area because the federal statutory
scheme of copyright and patent protection was a significant factor
in defining the proper scope of permissible state unfair competition
protection in several important Supreme Court cases."0
This article will critically examine Baker v. Selden and the
cases which have developed the exclusionary rule for printed sys-
tems in order to: (1) analyze the competing considerations in-
volved in evaluating the protection to be given under copyright law
for printed systems; (2) explore the impact of the results of that
evaluation on the protection of alternative state unfair competition
law; and (3) propose an analytical framework for approaching the
issue of copyright protection for printed systems.
I. THE COPYRIGHT EXCLUSION RULE
A. Origin of the Rule: Baker v. Selden
The subject matter of Baker v. Selden was unremarkable.
Charles Selden's copyrighted book, Selden's Condensed Ledger,
contained a textual essay explaining his bookkeeping system; ap-
pended to the text were ruled forms with headings illustrating the
bookkeeping system in operation. The distinguishing feature of
Selden's ledger, which produced results identical with double
entry bookkeeping, was the arrangement of the columns and head-
ings which displayed the entire operation of a day, week, or month
11 These cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) and
Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting Co., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) are discussed at notes
129-43 infra and accompanying text.
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on a single page or on facing pages." The alleged mimicking of this
arrangement by the defendant resulted in Selden's testator
bringing a successful infringement action in the circuit court.2 The
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court with instructions to dis-
miss the complaint, however, stating that the pivotal issue in the
case was "whether the exclusive property in a system of book-
keeping can be claimed, under the law of copyright, by means of a
book in which that system is explained."' 3 This statement of the
issue, the Court's discussion of the policies underlying copyright,
and their application to printed systems are the bases for the con-
fusion regarding the scope of copyright, a misunderstanding that
has continued despite repeated efforts to apply and clarify the
Baker v. Selden rule.
Importantly, the defendant was not alleged to have copied the
expression of either the text or the forms; rather the claim was that
Baker's work embodied the bookkeeping system explained and il-
lustrated in Selden's book." Since the case could have been de-
cided on this narrower ground, 5 the Court was not actually faced
with the broader question that formed the core of its opinion and
served as a basis for the extended theoretical discussion contained
in the opinion. The Court ignored its finding that the defendant,
Baker, had used a different arrangement of columns and head-
ings." That Baker may have copied other elements of the book's
arrangement is implied, however, by the Court's statement that if
Selden "had the exclusive right to the use of the system explained
in his book, it would be difficult to contend that the defendant does
not infringe it, notwithstanding the difference in his form of ar-
rangement."' 7 There is an indication in the opinion (albeit an un-
clear one) that the Court suspected that the arrangement present-
ing the entire operation for a day, week, or month on a single page
or two pages facing each other had been directly copied in the
defendant's publication. Otherwise, the plaintiff could not have
claimed infringement on the basis that Baker had "a similar plan
so far as results" were concerned since Selden's own system arrived
at the same "results" as double entry bookkeeping. The Court's
"1 101 U.S. at 100.
I Id. For simplicity, Selden will be referred to as the plaintiff.
1' 101 U.S. at 101.
I Id.
1 This point is underscored by Professor Nimmer in his discussion of the case.
NIMMER, supra note 6 at § 2.18[B] (1978).
"1 101 U.S. at 100.
17 Id.
[Vol. 81
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PROTECTING PRINTED SYSTEMS
failure to decide Baker v. Selden on the most narrow available
ground is, in itself, troublesome, as is the difficulty in conceptual-
izing the plaintiff's contentions and the differing nature of the
parties' publications from the Court's description. Nevertheless,
the most troublesome aspect of Baker v. Selden was the Court's
reliance on three seperate, inconsistent, but contiguous rationales.
Dismissal of the infringement complaint required only a finding
that the defendant's publication did not infringe the protected
elements of Selden's book; the three rationales in the Court's dis-
cussion of the policies underlying copyright protection have a
much broader sweep. In denying Selden protection against Baker's
copying, the Court made three fundamental findings: (1) the book-
keeping system failed to meet the requirement of originality which
the Court held excluded from copyright protection works resulting
from "mere labor"; (2) the mere use of the system as opposed to
explanation of it was permitted by an extention of the privilege of
fair use which considerably broadened its scope; and (3) the differ-
ences in the scope of protection between copyright and patent
properly relegated protection against use of a printed system exclu-
sively to patent. The Court's discussion of these rationales will be
expanded in the following section.
1. The Finding of Lack of Originality
In denying Selden protection against the alleged infringement,
the Court cited with approval Clayton v. Stone & Hall," a case
denying copyright to a daily market price list. In that case the
court had determined the requirements of the copyright act by
focusing on the language of the constitutional clause empowering
Congress to enact copyright legislation," and on the title of the
copyright statute. The Clayton opinion focused on the word
"science" in the copyright clause and held that the term required
limiting protection to properties of a "fixed, permanent, and dura-
ble character." Focusing on the title of the statute, the court said
that the act was passed "for the encouragement of learning and
' 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872).
" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 empowers Congress "[to promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." The clause does
not confer any substantive rights on any individual but only empowers the enact-
ment of copyright and patent legislation. E.g., American Tobacco Co. v. Werck-
meister, 207 U.S. 284, 290 (1907); Tape Indus. Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F.
Supp. 340, 346 (C.D. Cal.) appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1970).
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was not intended for the encouragement of mere industry, uncon-
nected with learning and the sciences.""0
This line of reasoning as adopted in Baker v. Selden is impor-
tant because it formed the basis for many susbsequent decisions
denying copyright to printed systems. Because of the limited tex-
tual expression in many printed systems, a closer analogy emerges
between printed systems and ideas than between printed systems
and expressions. Due to the prejudice in early decisions against
works which were the result of "mere industry," such as tables of
figures or the price list in Clayton v. Stone & Hall (as opposed to
works with literary qualities), printed systems were often equated
with this category of properties because of their utilitarian quality.
This practice is evident in the early decisions following Baker v.
Selden which used the Court's expansive theoretical discussion to
extend the exclusion beyond the actual holding. Even the Baker
Court qualified its broad statements with two particulars:
"ornamental designs, or pictorial illustrations addressed to the
taste;" and the actual statements of expression, whether textual
or pictorial in a book explaining a system were protected by copy-
right since "their form is their essence, and their object, the pro-
duction of pleasure in their contemplation. This is their final
end."'2' In contrast the Court said a printed system has its "final
end in application and use; and this application and use are what
the public derive from the publication of a book which teaches
them."' 2
2. Fair Use: The Printed System As Distinct From Its
Explanation
In Baker the Court also appeared to premise its decision on
the theory that a privilege of fair use existed for actual use of the
printed system but not to copy it for explanatory purposes. The
Court remarked:
2 5 F. Cas. 999, 1003 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872). Writing before the
decision in Baker v. Selden, Eaton Drone predicted that the appeal of the rationale
in Clayton v. Stone had waned and that a "more liberal doctrine" was prevalent
which would accord price lists and market reports the same copyright protection
granted directories. Drone cited Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113 (C.C.S.D. Ohio
1862) (No. 4,095), which held a garment-cutting chart copyrightable, as the princi-
pal basis for his optimism. E. DRONE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN
INTELLECTUAL PRODUCTIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES at 209-11
(1879). In Baker the Court distinguished Drury as inapplicable. 101 U.S. at 107.
101 U.S. at 103-04.
I [d. at 104.
[Vol. 81
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[Wlhere the art it teaches cannot be used without employing
the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the book, or such
as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be
considered as necessary incidents to the art, and given there-
with to the public; not given for the purpose of publication in
other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practi-
cal application.2
The thesis that the Court considered fair use as a factor in support
of its holding is further bolstered by the following discussion con-
tained in the opinion:
The plausability of the claim put forward by the complainant
in this case arises from a confusion of ideas produced by the
peculiar nature of the art [bookkeeping] . . . In describing
the art, the illustration and diagrams employed happen to cor-
respond more closely than usual with the actual work performed
by the operator who uses the art.74
This reasoning is also flatly inconsistent with the Court's con-
sideration of originality in the bookkeeping system and the third
ground of the demarcation between copyright and patent protec-
tion, since fair use is a doctrine which defines allowable limits of
copying for a work which contains sufficient originality and is the
proper subject of copyright. If Selden's book contained insufficient
originality to be entitled to copyright, the action should have been
dismissed for that reason alone, because originality is a constitu-
tional prerequisite for copyright protection. Similarly, if Selden's
work were subject only to patent protection, and not to copyright,
the action should have been dismissed since the work had not been
patented and the complaint was for copyright infringement alone.
Nonetheless, the Court considered fair use a defense to the copy-
right infringement action, and the decision added a gloss that
broadened traditional notions of fair use: "[T]he very object of
publishing a book on science or the useful arts [is] to communi-
cate to the world the useful knowledge it contains. But this object
would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without
incurring the guilt of piracy of the book."
By dividing copying into "use" and "explanation" the Court
freed the property for "use" although not for "explanation," a
distinction which appears to take into account the competitive
effect of the copying work on the copyrighted property and is also
Id. at 103.
:' Id. at 104.
21 Id. at 103.
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a factor in determining whether the use made of a copyrighted
work has been a fair one. Subsequent cases further blurred the
distinction between use and explanation by authorizing more ex-
tensive copying of printed systems for competing purposes than
the doctrine of fair use did, or does, for a work other than a printed
system.2 6
3. The Demarcation Between Copyright and Patent
Selden's infringement claim contained an allegation that
forms using similarly ruled lines and headings arranged compara-
bly would have violated his copyright, a claim coextensive with the
scope of protection obtained by patent. The Court concluded that
to grant Selden the asserted protection would be a "surprise and
fraud" on the public since copyright did not require any demon-
stration of novelty or invention. The Court based this assertion on
the following grounds: "The copyright of the book, if not pirated
from other works, would be valid without regard to the novelty, or
want of novelty, of its subject-matter. The novelty of the art or
thing described or explained has nothing to do with the validity of
the copyright."' Having stated the requirements Selden would
have to meet for the protection he claimed, the Court explained
the scope of the protection applicable to a book embodying a
printed system:
The use by another of the same methods of statement, whether
in words or illustrations, in a book published for teaching the
art would undoubtedly be an infringement of the copyright. The
use of the art is a totally different thing from a publication of
the book explaining it .... The description of the art in a
book, though entitled to the benefit of copyright, lays no foun-
dation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The object of the
one is explanation; the object of the other is use. The former
may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if
it can be secured at all, by letters-patent ....
Publication of the book without obtaining a patent on the system
thus resulted in a forfeiture of the use of the system to the public
domain. Selden's monopoly was narrowed to his explanation of the
printed system; this was the extent of the protection afforded by
the copyright.29
See notes 73-110 infra and accompanying text.
101 U.S. at 102.
Id. at 104-05.
Id. at 103.
[Vol. 81
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Even without the subsequent development which arguably
broadened the rule in Baker v. Selden excluding printed systems
from copyright protection, the case would remain troublesome
since the expansive view of fair use taken by the Court is inconsist-
ent with a viable monopoly on copyrighted works. The most trou-
blesome aspect of the opinion, however, has been the effect of
denying copyright protection to a work characterized as a printed
system, often without any further consideration of the distinction
accorded other works between protected and unprotected ele-
ments-stated differently, between the protected expression in a
work and the unprotected ideas.
The following sections of this article evaluate the directions
which case law and legislation have taken in response to Baker and
propose an approach for balancing the Baker exclusion with other
areas of copyright law.
B. Development of the Rule: Cases Subsequent to Baker v.
Selden
1. The Requirement of Originality
Evaluation of the rule excluding printed systems from copy-
right protection requires consideration of the policies underlying
the grant and the scope of the copyright monopoly. Since copyright
legislation is enacted pursuant to the power conferred on Congress
by the Constitution," early copyright cases identified originality as
a constitutional requirement to qualify a property for copyright.
3
'
In Baker v. Selden the Court endorsed what appears to have been
the then prevailing approach to originality and found that there
was insufficient originality in works that did not have a literary
quality; the inherent assumption was that some connection with
the fine arts was required to give a work intrinsic value. Absent
such a connection, simple effort invested in a work was insufficient
to qualify the material for copyright protection. The judicial hostil-
ity toward allowing copyright protection for nonliterary works was
tempered by the Supreme Court in several cases subsequent to
Baker where the Court refused to equate the commercial nature of
a property with a lack of originality.2
30 See note 19 supra.
31 Clayton v. Stone & Hall, 5 F. Cas. 999 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1829) (No. 2,872);
Bartlett v. Crittenden, 2 F. Cas. 967 (C.C.D. Ohio 1849) (No. 1,076); Martinetti v.
Maguire, 16 F. Cas. 920 (C.C. Cal. 1867) (No. 9,173).
1 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
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Quantitatively, only a modicum of originality is currently
needed to support a copyright. The requirement of originality is
little more than a prohibition of actual copying; 3 it is enough that
the integrated subject matter contains some reflection of the au-
thor's personality and acts as a mark of the author's creativity.
Originality inheres in the pattern of the work,3" and there will
ordinarily be sufficient originality if the arrangement is not dic-
tated by purely functional considerations. Sufficient originality to
satisfy the constitutional requirement and to support a copyright
has been found to be provided by the author's contribution in
creating: pen and ink display lettering;35 the arrangement of a
vacation schedule;36 the conceptual organization and presentation
of work;3" the sequence or phrasing of textual expression; 3 the
3 Best Medium Publishing Co. v. National Insider, Inc., 385 F.2d 384, 386 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 955 (1968). Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan
Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977); Russell v. Trimfit, Inc., 428 F.
Supp. 91, 93 (E.D. Pa. 1977) aff'd 568 F.2d 770 (1978); Moore v. Lighthouse Pub-
lishing Co., Inc., 429 F. Supp. 1304, 1311 (S.D. Ga. 1977); R. Dakin & Co. v. Charles
Offset Co., Inc., 441 F. Supp. 434, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
If a chart is utilized by a machine, arguably it contains no originality because
the machine dictates its organization. Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d
910 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied 332 U.S. 801 (1947); Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-
Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir.) cert. denied 321 U.S. 785 (1943). A better view
would be to recognize that within the confines required by the use of the machine
an author may be able to express enough creativity to meet the minimal originality
standard. Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp.
517, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). So long as the copyright does not foreclose all possible
variations of expression, it does not act as a monopoly on the subject matter even
where the subject matter allows for only a narrow range of expression. Morrissey v.
Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F. 2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967); Higgins v. Baker, 309
F. Supp. 635, 638 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Where there is a range of expression left open
by the first work this defense is inapplicable. Fedtro v. Kravez Mfg. Corp., 313 F.
Supp. 990, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). And, of course, without copying, even an identical
text would not be an infringement. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188
U.S. 239, 249 (1902); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d
Cir.) cert. denied 298 U.S. 669 (1936).
1 E.g., Amplex Mfg. Co. v. A.B.C. Plastic Fabricators, Inc., 125 U.S.P.Q. 648
(E.D. Pa. 1960).
1 See G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1952); Desclee
& Cie, S.A. v. Nemmers, 190 F. Supp. 381 (E.D. Wisc. 1961).
3, Manpower, Inc. v. Temporary Help of Harrisburg, Inc., 246 F. Supp. 788,
(E.D. Pa. 1965).
Addison-Wesley Publishers Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219, 224 (E.D.N.Y.
1963).
11 Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley Publication, Inc., 197 F.
Supp. 17, 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
[Vol. 81
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selection of the medium in which the material is expressed; 0 the
plan of compilation;"0 the association and combination of ideas or
numerical figures;4 layout;42 and textual arrangement or the total-
ity of design. 3 Because only some originality in the work's expres-
sion is required-expression being the number, variety, and sequ-
ence of a certain type of symbol"-the ideas which are the subject
of the expression need not be original.45
The originality present in an arrangement of material is visi-
ble in sharpest relief in cases involving compilations of public do-
main material. These may be properties which may contain no
textual or pictorial material original with the author, but which
result from a process of gathering, assembling, synthesizing, con-
densing, editing, or categorizing existing material. In these works
the requisite originality is reflected by the stamp the author places
on the compilation in exercising judgment in the selection of mate-
rial, so long as it is more than a trivial variation over the existing
work."0
In the context of maps and directories, the consideration of
originality is approached somewhat differently. The strict require-
ment of originality adopted in Baker from Clayton v. Stone which
treated nonliterary works as unoriginal has been changed to a re-
31 E.g., Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 143 (S.D.N.Y.
1968); Doran v. Sunset House Dist. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 945 (S.D. Cal. 1961),
aff'd 304 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
40 Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1963).
" Nutt v. National Inst. Inc. for the Improvement of Memory, 31 F.2d 236 (2d
Cir. 1929); PIC Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106, 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
" Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir.
1965) cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1965); Burndy Engineering Co. v. Penn-Union
Electric Corp., 25 F. Supp. 507, 508 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
'3 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
', Kalodner & Vance, The Relation Between Federal and State Protection of
Literary and Artistic Property, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1079, 1087 (1959).
11 Leeds Music Ltd. v. Robin, 358 F. Supp. 650, 659 (S.D. Ohio 1973); Pantone,
Inc. v. A.I. Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Powell v. Stan-
sky, 98 F. Supp. 434, 436 (D.S.D. 1951).
48 Donald v. Zack Meyer's T.V. Sales & Service, 426 F.2d 1027, 1029 (5th Cir.
1970) cert. denied, 400 U.S. 992 (1971); L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Loomskill, Inc. v. Slifka,
223 F. Supp. 845, 848 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) aff'd 330 F.2d 952 (2d Cir. 1964); Covington
Fabrics Corp. v. Artel Products, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Vogue
Ring Creations, Inc. v. Hardman, 410 F. Supp. 609, 612 (D.R.I. 1976); see generally
Note, Copyright Originality: Confusing the Standards for Granting Copyrights and
Patents, 79 W. VA. L. REv. 410 (1977).
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quirement that the maps be the product of the author's topo-
graphic observation, or some other independent effort to be copy-
righted. 7 Although the "direct observation" rule for maps is with-
out statutory authority,"8 the rule enjoys parallel authority in the
case of directories, where the conducting of a survey meets the
originality requirement. Descriptively, this requires the author to
have "started from scratch,"5° and assures that a small measure of
the author's scholarship has been injected into the property to
meet the constitutional requirement of originality. Like other
works, maps or directories are protected only against direct copy-
ing, and where a subsequent map or directory is independently
created, the existing work may be utilized for purposes of checking
the accuracy of the second map or directory."
One of the grounds relied on by the Court in Baker v. Selden
was that no originality was contained in the bookkeeping forms
because their functional nature dictated the textual expression.2
Although under the strict notion of originality adopted by the
Baker Court the functional and commercial nature of the book-
keeping system was synonomous with a lack of originality in con-
Ventura County v. Blackburn, 362 F.2d 515, 520 (9th Cir. 196); Amsterdam
v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 189 F.2d 104, 106 (3d Cir. 1951); Alaska Map Service,
Inc. v. Roberts, 368 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D. Alaska, 1973); Newton v. Vors, 364 F.
Supp. 562, 563-64 (D. Ore. 1973).
48 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 2.08[1][c][ii]. The requisite originality should
be found in any property where the author has invested more than a modicum of
labor, skill and judgment whether or not direct topographic observation has taken
place in the case of a map or a survey in the case of a directory. In rejecting the
direct observation rule in a map case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
has correctly stated that the rule appears
to rest on the judgment that the only facet of cartography that can result
in an original product, the only feature of the art worth protecting, results
from direct observation. However, we are unable to find a persuasive
reason for adopting this premise, and we therefore decline to rule that
maps present considerations that are distinct from all other copyright
cases. Expression in cartography is not so different from other artistic
forms seeking to touch upon external realities that unique rules are
needed to judge whether the authorship is original.
United States v. Hamilton, 58.3 F.2d 448, 451 (1978).
" See, e.g., Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281
F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); See also C.R. Leonard & Co.
v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38 (7th Cir. 1967).
10 Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 812 (7th Cir.
1942).
11 Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d
Cir. 1922) cert. denied 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
12 See.notes 18-22 supra, and accompanying text.
[Vol. 81
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sidering whether printed systems could be copyrighted, the courts
are increasingly amenable to the liberalized notions of originality
articulated in the map and directory cases. The reason for this
growing judicial acceptance is that it is the form, arrangement or
combination of material which represents the product of labor and
skilled effort by the author, separate and apart from that involved
in the development of the intellectual conception. Thus, in Long
v. Jordan a pamphlet expounding a system of old age pensions
was held entitled to copyright.
The originality required for copyrighting a plan for conducting
a business is closely analagous, since the copyrighted publication
which explains the particular plan often includes prepared forms
or other printed materials for conducting the business. In Briggs
v. New Hampshire Trotting & Breeding Association Inc.,5" the
plaintiff was the author of a copyrighted brochure which detailed
a plan for pooling bets. Under the plan, participants would bet on
seven consecutive horse races,. with the winnings pooled for the
series and then divided' among those selecting the largest number
of winning horses. Data processing machines were to be employed
to implement the pooling arrangement. In dismissing the plain-
tiff's infringement action, the court distinguished between printed
systems which contained the necessary requirements of originality
and those which failed to do so, indicating the protection afforded
should be proportionate to the originality and creativity involved.
The Briggs court drew the line not between "'[W]ritings' and
'systems,' but between original, complex, unique systems, and ele-
mentary, ordinary systems. The critical test is whether the plain-
tiff is entitled to protection for his own original, creative work, or
whether he is to be given a monopoly for ideas which are common
and ordinary."55 Rationalizing by use of analogy that the copyright
statute protects dramas, the court found no reason to preclude
protection to sports simply because they consist principally of ac-
tivity rather than words."
Similarly, since the originality necessary for copyright inheres
in the makeup of the publication and the word order of the text,
it should not be a bar to copyright that the business plan explained
is not original with the author. 5 Thus, a set of educational flash
0 29 F. Supp. 287 (N.D. Cal. 1939).
" 191 F. Supp. 234 (D.N.H. 1960).
u Id. at 236.
"Id.
. E.g., Powell v. Stranksy, 98 F. Supp. 434, 436 (D.S.D. 1951).
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cards containing basic public domain, arithmetic problems was
infringed by reproductions published by the defendant using print-
ing plates made by photocopying the plaintiff's cards. The district
court found the requisite originality in the selection, arrangement
and combination of elements contained in the set; an argument
that the utilitarian function of the cards prevented copyright was
dismissed as invalid.-8 In like manner, where the subject matter of
a copyright case consisted of a chart used to introduce the Russian
alphabet to English-speaking students, the originality required to
sustain copyright was in the "arrangement, order of presentation
and verbal illustrations" of using cognates to acquaint the reader
with Russian. 9
In Pantone, Inc. v. A. I. Friedman, Inc.,8 0 the court considered
the question of a color-matching system employed by artists and
printers as a medium for denominating tones. Pantone published
a copyrighted booklet which contained a color chart arranged in
gradations of shades: each color or shade was centered on a page
and the tonal spectrum flowing from it by the addition of transpar-
ent white or black was arrayed on either side. Manufacturers under
license from Pantone produced inks conforming to the shades dis-
played on the color chart. Although the court said that taken alone
a mere gradation of colors would fail to qualify for copyright pro-
tection, the grouping which facilitated selection and matching pro-
vided the necessary originality.8
Similar reasoning was used in the decision of Lee v. Runge,"2
which involved a book explaining a program of facial exercises
which were demonstrated by photographic illustrations. The court
considered the originality requirement as having been met, since
the plaintiff created something by her own labor and judgment;
collectively these amounted to the author's contributing some-
thing recognizably her own. Where the subject matter of the action
was a table prepared for bankers to use in computing interest and
discounts, originality was found in the combination of the words,
the selection of the figures and symbols, and the order and arrange-
ment which permitted computations to be made. Even though the
m Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co. 313 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1963);
accord, Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36
F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1929).
" Nikanov v. Simon & Schuster, 246 F. 2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1957).
"0 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
"1 Id. at 548.
62 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971).
[Vol. 81
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property was a compilation of public domain materials, there was
sufficient originality to support copyright since the author exer-
cised skill and discretion in selecting and in arranging the mate-
rial."
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp.6
involved a copyrighted printed answer sheet used to record stu-
dents' responses on intelligence and achievement tests for correc-
tion by optical scanning machines. In denying the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, the court held that the answer
sheets were the proper subject of copyright, reserving the question
of the infringement for determination after trial. The court held
that although the extent of originality and variation possible was
inherently limited by the mechanical requirements of the correct-
ing scanners, the efforts required for the author to structure the
sheet entailed skill, expertise and personal judgment in determin-
ing the information to be requested from or conveyed to the stu-
dent, and in the positioning of these materials within the confines
of the page. Since the answer sheet was the product of the author's
independent creation, the material was entitled to copyright de-
spite being substantially identical to existing answer sheets. Fur-
ther, the court said the answer sheets conveyed information in the
textual directions, and by the reference to the examination with
which it was being used; even considered independently from the
instructions, the symbols designating question or response spaces
were held to be protected expression." The court in Harcourt,
Brace narrowed the ambit of the Baker v. Selden distinction be-
tween the terms "use" and "explanation" on the grounds that they
make no clear division; in almost all cases a mixture of use and
explanation existed in forms, except those which were used in re-
cording machine-generated data. In regard to the answer sheets
before it, the court could find no clear division between the expla-
nation of a system (directions on use in answering examination)
and its use (the answer sheet as recording form).66
" Edwards & Deutsch Lithographing Co. v. Boorman, 15 F.2d 35 (7th Cir.
1926), cert. denied 273 U.S. 738 (1926). See also Brightley v. Littleton, 37 F. 103
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1888); C.S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Consolidated Music Publishers, Inc. v. Ashley
Publications, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
" 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The Copyright Office had accepted the
answer sheets for copyright registration, thereby characterizing them as not within
the regulation that precluded registration for forms used only for recording informa-
tion. Id. at 524, 525.
Id. at 524.
" Id. at 524, n. 4. The court followed what it considered to be the "clear
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In many respects the holding in Harcourt, Brace & World
paralleled the reasoning in Norton Printing Co. v. Augustana
Hospital"7 which involved forms for recording laboratory test data.
Norton Printing held that the determination of whether the form
could be copyrighted could be made on the basis of whether the
forms conveyed, or simply recorded, information. A finding that
the forms conveyed information regarding the tests to be con-
ducted, and that the format and arrangement were used to indi-
cate where the data was to be recorded, qualified the forms for
copyright. Although the court found it unnecessary to decide the
issue, cogency was found in the argument that the distinction
drawn between forms which conveyed information and forms
which only recorded data was without constitutional foundation,
so that any property with the necessary originality should receive
copyright protection."8
These cases are indicative of the approach taken in deciding
the issue of whether sufficient originality is contained in a work
that could be correctly characterized as a printed system based on
the interrelationship of its elements and its functional nature.
What remains of the originality requirement for systems applied
by the Court in Baker v. Selden is unclear. The Baker Court
elected to follow a strict requirement of originality, and one that
discriminated against nonliterary works by characterizing them as
unoriginal. Since later Supreme Court cases 9 significantly re-
mandate" of the 1909 Copyright Act to allow protection for all the "writings" of an
author and held that the use/explanation distinction should be limited to forms
which merely serve as recordation devices for mechanically recording data.
- 155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1967).
" Id. at 134-35.
11 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53
(1884). But see Justice Douglas' dissent from the refusal to grant certiorari in Lee
v. Runge, 404 U.S. 887 (1971). Justice Douglas urged the Court to consider whether
the proper test under the U.S. Constitution art. I, § 8, cl. 8 supra, note 19 was
originality or novelty. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had applied the
test of originality, Runge v. Lee, 441 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1971), which has been
applied generally in determining the works given copyright protection, e.g., Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951); Hoague-Sprague Corp.
v. Frank C. Meyer Co., 31 F.2d 583, (E.D.N.Y. 1929), although only the Copyright
Act of 1976, supra note 2, at § 102, has expressly limited protection to "original
works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." In the Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879) (U.S. v. Steffens; U.S. v. Wittemenn; U.S. v.
Johnson), the Court held that a trademark could not be considered an original
writing of an author since a trademark "may be, and generally is, the adoption of
something already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using it." Id.
[Vol. 81
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stricted the ambit of judicial inquiry into the originality present
in a work by focusing solely on the quantity rather than the quality
of the originality, that portion of Baker has been implicitly over-
ruled. This approach has been generally followed by courts consid-
ering the question of originality required for printed systems, and
the originality to qualify printed systems for copyright protection
now largely parallels that required of other properties.10 This has
resulted from decisions which have narrowed the scope of Baker;
by focusing on the quantity rather than on the quality of originality
present in a system, the courts have correctly aligned printed sys-
tems with other materials.
The peculiar nature of printed systems is not best recognized
and dealt with by requiring a different standard of originality but
rather by adjusting the scope of protection. A printed system is
composed of elements of expression, and is the result of intellectual
labor on the part of the author, no less than in the case of literary
property. Indeed, because a printed system is composed of interre-
lated elements, each of which may have enough originality to qual-
ify as a separately copyrighted element, a printed system often
contains multiple increments of originality.
The argument that the functional nature of the system pre-
scribes the expression and thereby precludes viable originality is
not universal enough to deserve elevation to preclude protection as
a matter of law. A printed system requires the same judicial exami-
nation as any other property to determine whether the requisite
originality is present, a test which has been translated largely into
a showing of individual effort on the part of the author.7 By the
creation of a printed system, the underlying idea has been reduced
from an abstraction to an expression. Thus, a printed system, as a
group of diverse units integrated to function in unison, is one step
removed from an idea, or one shorthand character, or one color. In
forming the different characters into a shorthand system, or the
colors into a coordinated wheel, the interdependence by which the
at 94. The Court held a statute which provided for federal registration of trade-
marks invalid on this basis.
70 E.g., Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 816 (1958); Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 140
F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944); Norton Printing Co. v.
Augustana Hospital, 155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1967); Pantone, Inc. v. A.I.
Friedman, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
71 See notes 33-54 supra and accompanying text.
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units relate to each other is an element of organization and ar-
rangement that is justly entitled to be protected. The fear that a
minimal requirement of originality will unduly restrict innovation
is unwarranted. To permit copyright for printed systems leaves
open the question of the proper scope of protection; indeed, the
distinction drawn in Baker v. Selden between use and explanation
implicitly recognizes this idea.72
2. The Scope of Protection: Fair Use
As discussed in a preceding section of this article, the rule
announced in Baker v. Selden excluding printed systems from co-
pyright has been greatly limited by subsequent decisions which
generally permit copyright for qualifying elements composing a
system. 3 The arrangement of the elements of expression, including
the textual or pictorial explanation of how a printed system is
implemented, is subject to copyright, provided the arrangement is
the result of original scholarship on the author's part.' As with all
copyrighted works, the protection a printed system receives is sub-
ject to the limitation that the unprotected underlying idea is freely
usable by all so long as the means of use does not track the copy-
righted expression.75 Even copying of the expression is not an in-
fringement so long as the copying does not exceed the bounds of
fair use, a doctrine which "eludes precise definition; broadly
speaking, it means that a reasonable portion of a copyrighted work
may be reproduced without permission when necessary for a legiti-
mate purpose which is not competitive with the copyright owner's
market for the work."7 As a result of the indefinite nature of fair
use, it is necessarily decided on a case by case basis using guide-
lines which can be distilled from decisions which have developed
- 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1879). The Baker Court concluded simply: "the mere
copyright of Selden's book did not confer upon him the exclusive right to make and
use account-books ruled and arranged as designated by him and described and
illustrated in said book." Id. at 107.
See section II(A)(1) of this article.
7, See notes 33-46 supra and accompanying text.
7' Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674 (1879); Burk v. Johnson, 146 F. 209 (8th Cir.
1906); Burnell v. Chown, 69 F. 993 (C.C.N.D. Ohio, 1895); First Financial Market-
ing Services Group v. Field Promotions, 286 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Drugtax,
Inc. v. Systems Programming Corp., 147 U.S.P.Q. 313 (D.C.M.D. Pa. 1965); Gaye
v. Gillis, 167 F. Supp. 416 (D. Mass. 1958); Borden v. General Motors Corp., 28 F.
Supp. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
11 CoPYRIOHT LAW REVIsION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES CoPYRiGHT LAW, 87th Congress, 1st Ses-
sion, 24 (Comm. Print 1961).
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the privilege: (1) the purpose and character of the copying; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion copied in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole;
and (4) whether any diminishment in the value of the copyrighted
work is likely to result from the copying.7 These factors have also
been adopted by the General Revision's provision on fair use, the
first statutory recognition of the judicially-created defense. 8
Notwithstanding that the monopoly a copyright owner re-
ceives is restricted by the privilege of fair use which permits rea-
sonable and limited copying, even of the exact wording or other
concrete expression,79 reproduction of all or substantially all of a
copyrighted work cannot be defended as fair'use1s Further, be-
cause the scope of a copyright is limited to protection of the expres-
sion from copying, an independently created property, even if it is
identical, is not an infringement."'
Infringement also occurs only when the original elements of a
property are copied, 2 since only those elements of a work are pro-
tected. Baker v. Selden failed to consider adequately this aspect
of the scope of copyright protection. In sharp contrast to patent,
copyright does not grant an exclusive right to the art disclosed;"
copyright protects no more than the expression and does not in-
quire into the novelty or originality of the idea underlying the
expression. Because expression includes such elements as arrange-
" STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND Co-
PYRIGHTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, United States Senate, 86th Congress,
2nd Session Pursuant to S. Res. 240, Study 14.
11 Copyright Act of 1976, note 2, supra § 107. House Report No. 94-1476 states
that the section was intended to "restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use,
not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Congress,
3d Sess. 57, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5670.
"Thompson v. Gernsback, 94 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
Rosemont Enterprises Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1966); Flick-Reedy Corp. v. Hydro-Line Mfg.
Co., 351 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1965); see Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962);
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
" White v. Bender, 185 F. 921, 925 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1911).
s' Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff'd sub. nom. Weir
v. Gordon, 216 F.2d 508 (6th Cir. 1954); Oxford Book Co. v. College Entrance Book
Co., 98 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1938).
13 E.g., Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725 (1926). 35 U.S.C.A. § 154 (Cum. Supp.
1978) gives the patentee "the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
the invention."
" Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
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ment and style, however, extensive paraphrasing will constitute
infringement s
In the areas of maps and directories, the materials closest to
printed systems, the question of fair use has been dealt with by
requiring a subsequent author to do an original topographic obser-
vation or a survey; his having done so, an existing copyrighted map
or directory may be used as a reference to ensure the accuracy of
the new map or directory." This approach would have been the
best to apply to printed systems, The gloss added to fair use by
the Court's division in Baker v. Selden of copying into use and
explanation unnecessarily compounded the confusion surrounding
fair use. The question of whether copying rises to the level of an
infringement is better determined by focusing on what is the cen-
tral concern in determining if the copying is privileged as fair use:
whether the copying seriously diminishes the value of the copied
property." This may have been what the Baker Court intended to
accomplish. Since Baker's works were explanatory, his revenues
were presumably derived principally from the sale of the texts,
rather than from the sale of forms. A copying work which competed
directly with Selden's book could have seriously diminished his
revenues. But copying for purposes of use involved a different mar-
ket, leaving the value of a book explaining the printed system little
diminished. Since the Court approached the question of fair use
by dividing copying works into use and exp]hnation, as well as
relying on the separate' but overlapping rat6halesin disposing of
the case," the holding has been misconceived by some courts as
precluding protection even for properties which have been copied
verbatim and for directly competing purposes. 9
"Rosemont Enterprises Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1966); Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n, 144
F. 83 (7th Cir. 1906), affl'd, 209 U.S., 20 (1908); Holdredge v. Knight Publishing
Corp., 214 F. Supp. 921 (S.D. Cal. 1963); Schellberg v. Empringham, 36 F.2d 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1929).
U See G.R. Leonard & Co. v. Stack, 386 F.2d 38, 40 (7th Cir. 1967); Dun v.
Lumbermen's Credit Ass'n., 144 F. 83, 84 (7th Cir. 1906); Jewelers' Circular Pub.
Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 274 F. 932, 935 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 281 F. 83 (2d Cir.
1922), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 581 (1922). See generally Lurvey, Verifying from Prior
Directories, 13 BuLL. COPYRIGHT Soc., 271, 282, item 331 (1966).
" Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. P.F. Collier & Son Co., 26 U.S.P.Q. 40, 43
(S.D.N.Y. 1934); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
u See section II of this article.
0 Crume v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 755 (1944); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1970);
Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942). But see Conti-
[Vol. 81
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At best, it is unclear whether the rule in Baker v. Selden was
intended to give its imprimatur to such extensive copying. Yet
early cases applying the exclusionary rationale simply determined
whether the property had the qualities of a system, including
practical application; this label alone was enough to preclude pro-
tection even though the property may have contained considerable
originality. Brief English Systems v. Owen'0 involved a system of
speedwriting consisting of letters of the English alphabet and
punctuation marks which utilized condensed phonetic spellings.
The court held that there was "no literary merit in a mere system"
and that the copyrightable elements were in "the manner of treat-
ment" which was limited to the "manner, method, style, or literary
thought" of the publication." Although citing Baker, the court
failed to make any distinction between explanation and use.
Owen's publications were explanatory. The facts are ambiguous as
to the extent that Owen's system tracked the Dearborn system.
Since Dearborn had used public domain word lists, as had Owen,
apparently no copyright was claimed in the word selection, al-
though such a list could be protected if the requirement of original-
ity were met. 2 A similar result was reached in Griggs v. Perrin,
where a system of phonetic shorthand which had been explained
in the plaintiff's copyrighted book was simply expanded in the
defendant's publication. Again, no infringement was found. 3
The better approach is to recognize that a printed system can
be copyrighted and to apply the same infringement standard as is
used for maps and directories. While infringement is irrevocably
intertwined with the question of originality, to require a competi-
tor to "start from scratch" does no violence to the statutory
scheme. The balancing of the scope of protection with the original-
ity present in any property gives adequate assurance that a copy-
right proprietor will not be awarded a monopoly on an area of
subject matter while at the same time providing the protection
that will promote the policy interests underlying copyright.
This approach was taken in Lee v. Runge," which involved a
series of facial exercises illustrated by photographs. The defendant
nental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
816 (1958).
" 48 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 283 U.S. 858 (1931).
" Id. at 556.
32 See notes 33-72 supra and accompanying text.
" 49 F. 15 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1892).
"1 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887 (1971).
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was found to have infringed the "treatment of the subject matter"
in the plaintiff's book by including the plaintiff's exercises in her
book; although the defendant's illustrating pictures were rephoto-
graphed, only one of the exercises in the defendant's publication
was original. The court, however, failed adequately to limit the
scope of the plaintiffs copyright. If the defendant had been simply
a copyist who appropriated the arrangement of the plaintiffs book,
then the finding of infringement was accurate. Since the defendant
had been formerly employed by the plaintiff and was therefore
familiar with the exercises, however, a more detailed examination
was necessary to detemine whether her photographs resulted from
her own determination of how best to pose the models or whether
the defendant had posed her models along the lines of illustrations
in the plaintiff's book. If the defendant's pictures were indepen-
dent creations, there was no copying of the "treatment of the sub-
ject." In such a situation to find copyright infringement gives the
plaintiff a monopoly on the exercises themselves as opposed to the
expression in her publication.
The basic difficulty in these cases results from the need to
accommodate the protection accorded a property with the compet-
ing interest of stimulating creativity. Since copyright never pro-
vides a monopoly on the underlying ideas, the subject matter re-
mains available for later authors. The question of functonal use,
an ingredient in a work characterized as a printed system, requires
that the privilege of fair use be expanded to permit noncompeting
use of the system, something that the Court in Baker recognized,
but failed to implement in fashioning the decree in that case.
A case which dealt well with this aspect of Baker is Stone &
McCarrick, Inc. v. Dugan Piano Co."5 There the plaintiff had pub-
's 210 F. 399 (E.D. La. 1914). The trial court conceded for the purpose of
argument that the advertisements contained in the plaintiff's book were copyright-
able, noting that the cases went both ways on the question. But by characterizing
the plaintiff's book as a manual of instruction the court was able to find that no
infringement occurred even though one of the advertisements from the plaintiff's
book had been reproduced. The court's statement that the case is on "all fours"
with Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), is only partially correct; in Baker the
Court found no copying of the copyrighted work. The Dugan court's assessment of
the application of the principles of Baker is certainly correct. In affirming, the
Court of Appeals was not willing to assume advertisements were copyrightable, and
particularly those which contained misstatements having a tendency to mislead
and deceive the public. 220 F. 837 (5th Cir. 1915). A right to private use has also
been implied from the marketing of a book of forms. American Institute of Archi-
tects v. Fenichel, 41 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). See also S. Cohen, Fair Use in
the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT LAw SYMP. 43, 48 (1955).
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lished a copyrighted book which contained a series of instructions
for producing advertisements. The defendant used a part of the
book as an advertisement for his products. The court declined to
find infringement on the rationale that the defendant was simply
using the publication for the purpose for which it was designed;
this .was "use" as opposed to "explanation." By this approach to
fair use, even a larger amount of material may be taken as long as
its publication remains noncompetitive with the plaintiff's. This
should be the case with any personal use by an individual; only
where the property is included in a competing publication should
the privilege not apply.
The functional nature of a printed system necessarily limits
the scope of the monopoly, particularly where the expression is set
by extrinsic factors. For example, the requirements of the optical
scanning machines limited the variation possible in the answer
sheets in Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls
Corporation." But this fact in itself should be no bar to copyright
protection. Such is the case with maps and directories where the
expression is preordained by the subject matter; but, as the origi-
nality required in those cases is tailored to the subject matter, so
is the scope of protection." By focusing on the independent effort
involved in creating a system, the protection can be tailored to
preclude any lock on the subject matter, while at the same time
affording a modicum of protection to the property which is a writ-
ing created as the result of intellectual effort. The difficulties posed
by attempting to bifurcate a property into use and explanation are
compounded by the realization that no strict demarcation is possi-
ble.98
The bifurcation of a property into protected "expression" and
unprotected "ideas"" is premised on the underlying purpose of the
copyright clause in the Constitution: to promote societal progress
by encouraging authors by extending them a limited monopoly on
their works. 1' The primary purpose of benefit to society overrides
" 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
See note 86 supra, and accompanying text.
" Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517,
524, n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Copyright Act of 1976, note 2 supra, § 102.
'® In Mazer v. Stein, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he economic philoso-
phy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science
and useful Arts.'" 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
23
Olson: The Legal Protection of Printed Systems
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1978
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
any individual interests and is expressly recognized in the policy
underlying copyright protection. These same policies are recog-
nized in the doctrine of fair use which permits copying within
prescribed limits, offsetting the benefits which accrue to the public
from permitting the use against the loss to the creating author.,
The monopoly accruing to the copyright proprietor is a limited
one. Succinctly, it is the right to multiply copies, and as a neces-
sary corollary this includes the right to exclude others from so
doing. 1"" Since the prohibition is against copying of expression,
protection accrues to the author's word choice and style."'3 This
excludes any protection simply for basic themes. At that level of
abstraction, to grant copyright protection would be a monopoly on
such a substantial ambunt of material as to inhibit the basic pur-
pose of the constitutional clause in promoting authorship. 14 A
copyright in no way preempts or monopolizes a subject. A different
means of expression avoids the copyright.' 5 Within the confines of
these general limitations, however, protection should be given to
the elements of a property which are entitled to copyright and
which, together, comprise the author's expression.
In the context of a printed system, this means particularly the
elements of organization, as well as any material, such as short-
hand characters which, taken collectively, contain sufficient origi-
nality to be copyrighted. Where the printed system operates
through a series of forms and the copier is marketing competing
forms, protection should be extended to the expression just as with
any other property. Where the copying is for the purpose of imple-
menting the system, however, the fair use privilege should ordinar-
ily permit the copying. In sum, this approach arrives at much the
same result as the bifurcation into use and explanation that Baker
v. Selden employed. However, the advantage in this approach is
" See notes 76-80 supra and accompanying text. See also Rosemont Enter-
prises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) and Time, Inc. v.
Bernard Geis Assoc., 293 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) indicating that the public
interest in a particular topic will widen the fair use privilege. See generally, Nim-
mer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantee of Free Speech and
Press? 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1180 (1970).
102 Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
110 Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970);
Norton Printing Co. v. Augustana Hospital, 155 U.S.P.Q. 133 (D.C.N.D. Ill. 1967).
I" But see Bradbury v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 287 F.2d 478 (9th
Cir. 1961); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D.N.Y.
1963).
10 American Visuals Corp. v. Holland, 219 F.2d 223, 224 (2d Cir. 1955).
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that it does not require any distinction to be made on the basis of
such an indefinite standard. Instead, by focusing on the question
of competing use and diminishment in value of the copied prop-
erty, the reviewing court is able to isolate effectively the relevant
issues. Not to permit noncompeting copying may well be tanta-
mount to giving the author a monopoly on an idea. ' °1 When the
copying involves a competitor, the approach places a burden on
the competitor of originating his own material. A subsequent au-
thor is in no way foreclosed from expressing the underlying idea,
even in a similar fashioh, s6 longas it is not the result of copying.
A standard of infringemet, aaralei;g that used in the map and
directory cases thus rewards the fftr -of the first author while in
no way precluding future authors from exploring the same subject
area.
107
Several courts have approached an application of Baker v.
Selden that is generally consistent with that suggested in this arti-
cle. Crume v. Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. "I involved four copy-
righted pamphlets which detailed a plan for reorganizing insolvent
insurance companies. The court found the requisite originality in
the materials but held that the premise underlying Baker permit-
ted both the use of the reorganization plan disclosed and also, as
a corollary, that of the descriptive words or phrases to the extent
necessary to accomplish the use of the plan.
Crume took a thrust that would allow a wide latitude of copy-
ing. On the premise that the Baker rationale permitted the use for
practical application where the means of implementation was lan-
guage, Crume would permit the use of language in such instances,
expressly disapproving decisions that required changing of words
as an undue restriction on the right to use the underlying ideas.
In Mazer v. Stein, which allowed copyright protection for statu-
ettes intended to be used as lamp bases, however, the Baker ration-
ale was implicitly narrowed. There, the Supreme Court described
the case as applying only to forms which did not disclose informa-
tion.09 While not expressly limiting Baker, it is consistent with the
limitations placed on the case by a number of lower courts.'1° While
not fully recognizing the limitations that the inherent defects in
I" See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966).
" See note 51 supra and accompanying text.
,08 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. denied 322 U.S. 755 (1944).
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
" E.g., Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84 (6th Cir. 1967); Gelles-
Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1963).
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the Baker Court's reasoning impose on application of the rule to
printed systems, these cases collectively show a laudatory willing-
ness to analyze the differing grounds of approach in Baker. Cer-
tainly the automatic exclusion from copyright protection that
Baker might dictate is no longer absolute but is to be determined
using an analysis that segregates protected from unprotected ele-
ments and cautiously defines the scope of the protection to assure
that it does not become a monopoly precluding another author
from independently producing a related work.
The fair use standard applied by the Baker Court is consistent
with its hostile approach to meaningful protection for printed sys-
tems generally, but a critical analysis of the Court's reasoning and
subsequent development in the case law requires a modification of
the Baker Court's approach. Printed systems should be subject to
no more liberal copying for use by a competing publisher than
other works. A more difficult question is presented by private use.
Generally such a use is noncompeting. A shorthand method, for
example, is exploited in the medium of a book both presenting and
explaining its operation. Where the printed system is embodied in
a form where private use publication would diminish a possible
source of author revenue, no general rule can be stated as to
whether the use is a fair one. The best approach involves balancing
the different criteria that collectively determine whether the use
made of copyrighted material by a subsequent author is permissi-
ble. In this respect a printed system should be treated no differ-
ently from other copyrighted material.
3. The Demarcation Between Copyright and Patent
Although the Court in Baker v. Selden avoided ruling on the
patentability of the bookkeeping system, a major premise of the
decision assumes that the scope of protection necessitated that the
patent requirement of novelty be met if any protection were to be
granted."' In sharp contrast to the minimal standard of originality
required for copyright,"' the patent standard of novelty is stringent
and subject to administrative examination by the Patent Office
before, and judicial review after, the patent is issued."' In return
for the inventor's meeting the more difficult novelty standard, the
scope of patent protection is correspondingly broader than copy-
" 101 U.S. at 102.
22 E.g., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
"3 35 U.S.C. §§ 131, 282(2) (1970).
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right protection; it protects against the use, manufacture and sale
of the invention even if independently discovered for the statutory
period."' The fear of monopoly that the Court in Baker assumed
would result if Selden's copyright claim was upheld resulted in its
concluding that such extensive protection necessarily restricted
printed systems to patent protection, if they were to be protected
at all." 5
This aspect of the Baker rationale was applied in a case with
similar facts, Aldrich v. Remington Rand, Inc., "6 where the plain-
tiff claimed infringement of a manual containing text and forms
for establishing a tax bookkeeping system for governmental units.
The defendants copied and distributed the forms to a city for use
in establishing an accounting system similar to the plaintiff's sys-
tem. The court held that patent and not copyright would be the
only protection against a use by the public of the system described
by the text and illustrated by the forms, which were held not
subject to copyright. As Briggs v. New Hampshire Trotting &
Breeding Association, Inc., " underscored, however, patent protec-
tion is unavailable for systems consisting solely of printed matter.
The court's remarks are apposite since some exclusionary cases
subsequent to Baker v. Selden premise the denial of copyright at
least partially on the allocation of subject matter between patent
and copyright."' Since patent is unavailable for printed systems
unless they are used in conjunction with structural devices for
which patent protection is available,"' to deny copyright is tanta-
mount to denying all protection. A blind spot arises in the scope
and breadth of protection unless a judgment is made that printed
systems are unentitled to protection. Although Congress is author-
ized to grant protection. within the constitutional confines of the
copyright clause, copyright is a matter of congressional grace; it
"1 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 101, 102, 131 (1952); Neufeld-Furst & Co. v. Jay-Day Frocks,
112 F.2d 715, 716 (2d Cir. 1940); A.C. Gilbert Co. v. Shemitz, 45 F.2d 98, 99 (2d
Cir. 1930).
£1 101 U.S. at 102.
" 52 F. Supp. 732 (N.D. Tex. 1942).
"' E.g., In re Miller, 418 F.2d 1392 (C.C.P.A. 1969); Ex'parte Glenn, 155
U.S.P.Q. 42 (Pat. Off. Board of Appeals 1966); see generally A. DELLER, 1 DELLER's
WALKER ON PATENTS §§ 22, 26 (2d ed. 1964) (Supp. 1975).
" E.g., Griggs v. Perrin, 49 F. 15 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1892).
" In re Montgomery, 214 F.2d 136, 139 (C.C.P.A. 1954); Conover v. Coe, 99
F.2d 377, 379 (D.C. Cir. 1938); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 912 (C.C.P.A. 1934);
Guthrie v. Curlett, 10 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1926); Boyle v. Ladd, 138 U.S.P.Q. 289,
290 (D.D.C. 1963); Briggs v. New Hampshire Trotting & Breeding Assoc., Inc., 191
F. Supp. 234, 236 (D.N.H. 1960).
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exists solely as a result of statutory grant for works subject to
federal protection, and Congress may segregate certain classes of
works and deny them protection.'
To the extent that the rationale of Baker v. Selden rests on
properly defining the respective subject matter of copyright and
patent, the result can be criticized because the premise is inaccur-
ate. Since patent is unavailable for printed systems to the extent
that to grant a copyright on a printed system would be to give
protection parallel in scope to patent, the result is erroneous. To
deny protection based on these faulty premises is inequitable. Co-
pyright should be granted on the basis of a determination that
sufficient originality is present to fulfill the necessary requirement.
Correspondingly, the degree of the protection should extend to the
copyrightable components of the systems, subject to the privilege
of fair use. The question of patent protection should not be in-
volved.
I. ALTERNATIVE STATE PROTECTION: MISAPPROPRIATION
Under the federal copyright statute of 1909 until divestitive
publication occurs, state common law copyright shelters a prop-
erty against infringement.' Under the 1976 copyright revision act
the federal sphere of protection becomes operative from the mo-
ment the work is placed in a tangible medium of expression, rather
than from the time of divestitive publication.'22 After the point in
time at which federal copyright protection becomes operative, un-
certainty arises as to whether any state protection is available to
the author of a printed system if the copyright exclusion rule of
Baker v. Selden were to be applied with its full breadth. Since
publication preempted common law or state copyright protection
under the copyright laws prior to the present act' and will be
preempted from the moment of tangible expression under the Co-
pyright Act of 1976 whether published or not,2 ' state protection
would have to be sought under the general doctrine of
I" Tape Industries Ass'n of America v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (D. Cal.
1970); White v. Kimmel, 94 F. Supp. 502 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
" DeCosta v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 377 F.2d 315 (1st Cir. 1967),
cert. denied 389 U.S. 1007 (1967); G. Ricordi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d
Cir. 1952).
I, Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 102(a).
'2 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Hearst Corp. v. Shopping
Center Network, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Mu Copyright Act of 1976, supra note 2, § 102(a).
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"misappropriation." Misappropriation is a tort so labeled in the
landmark case of International News Service v. Associated Press, "I
(hereinafter referred to as I.N.S.) where the Associated Press
sought to enjoin International News Service from supplying its
clients with news taken from Associated Press releases. The Court
posited the issue as the protection of the commercial value of news
between competitors. Noting that the news itself, the historical
facts of an event, was not protected by copyright, the Court de-
cided the question on the principles of unfair competition. In af-
firming the trial court decision, the Supreme Court structured the
decision not to prohibit International News Service from using the
news dispatches entirely, but only to the extent that delay in their
use was necessary to prevent depreciating the value of Associated
Press distribution. The I.N.S. case, according to the Court, in-
volved:
[Taking material that has been acquired ... as the result of
organization and the expenditure of labor, skill, and money,
and which is salable by complainant [A.P.] for money ....
[The] defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is
endeavoring to reap where it has not sown, and by disposing of
it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's mem-
bers is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have
sown.
126
Although jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship in
LIN.S., the Court premised its decision on the federal common law,
a basis that subsequently disappeared from the ambit of the fed-
eral courts as a result of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.'2 Despite this tacit
M 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
M Id. at 239-40.
t- 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie Railroad v. Tompkins halted further development
of unfair competition as a matter of federal common law and required state law to
be applied when the action was not based on a federal statute. See Pecheur Lozenge
Co. v. National Candy Co., 315 U.S. 666 (1942). Because many unfair competition
claims are brought in federal courts on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1970), however, misappropriation has developed largely in the
federal courts. See Continental Cas. Co. v. Beardsley, 151 F. Supp. 28, 42 n. 54
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), modified 253 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958). (Also 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b)
(1970) provides for federal jurisdiction when a claim of unfair competition is "joined
with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, or trademark
laws.") On these claims brought under pendent jurisdiction, courts have split as to
whether state or federal law applies to the unfair competition claim. Time Inc. v.
Viobin Corp., 128 F.2d 860 (7th Cir. 1942); Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Stolzberg, 69
F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1947). See generally C. Bunn, The National Law of Unfair
Competition, 62 HARv. L. REV. 987 (1949); 4 R. CAu.iAN, THE LAw or UNFAm
COMPETITION AND TRADEMARKs, § 93.1 (1978).
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overruling, LN.S. has retained an understandable allure for courts
required to decide the equities present in a case of misappropria-
tion. But notwithstanding this basic appeal, the I.N.S. approach
is fraught with difficulties. Even at the time of the decision, Jus-
tice Brandeis argued in dissent in IN.S. that the failure of the
copyright statute to grant such protection should preclude recogni-
tion of a "quasi-property" right unless the extension had been
legislatively generated.'2 The problems of applying misappropria-
tion are multiplied by the uncertain ramifications of the expansion
of the federal doctrine of preemption in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co. '2 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. 'In
In basic terms, to invoke successfully misappropriation, the
author of a printed system who was denied copyright protection
would have to parallel the appropriation of his property with the
competitive appropriation present in I.N.S. Even before the fed-
eral preemption doctrine was expanded in Sears-Compco,1:1 a
number of courts had refused to adopt the theory on reasoning that
is similar to that in Justice Brandeis' dissent in I.N. S.'32 Particu-
larly, these courts declined to apply the doctrine to any published
work, reasoning that the federal copyright statute preempted the
field and that to grant state protection where the author failed to
obtain, or the property was ineligible for, copyright was inconsist-
ent with the federal scheme of protection. Judge Learned Hand,
in particular, voiced strong opposition to any extension of I.N.S.
to "writings," as constitutionally defined, on the argument that
such protection would conflict with the uniformity of protection
that the constitution intended; Hand would have confined I.N.S.
to its facts.'3 Consistent with this approach is the further argu-
ment that the vagueness of differing law that results from state
protection as encompassing as misappropriation not only offends
the inherent interest in uniformity present in the copyright statute
but could also undermine the copying that Sears-Compco intended
to promote.
248 U.S. at 248-67.
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
376 U.S. 234 (1964).
,3, Both Sears and Compco considered questions of state protection for invalid
patent designs. The Court's remarks are apposite to "writings" as well, however,
and some specific references are made to the impact of the doctrine on copyright.
376 U.S. at 231 n.7, 376 U.S. at 231. See also Quick Point Pencil Co. v. Aronson,
567 F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 2843 (1978) (No. 1413).
1 248 U.S. at 248-67 (1918).
'3 National Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d
594 (2d Cir. 1951).
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In Sears-Compco competitors had been enjoined by trial
courts from copying product features which had been held ineligi-
ble for design patent protection; in both cases the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit allowed state law protection on a finding
that Illinois law permitted holding one competitor liable for simply
copying and marketing another competitor's unpatented article.
"
3
In reversing that decision the Supreme Court enunciated a doc-
trine that widened the ambit of federal copyright and patent
preemption and affirmatively permitted the copying of designs
which did not qualify for design patent. Although the Court gener-
ally denied states the power to prohibit the copying of a published
but unpatented or uncopyrighted article,' 0 subsequent cases have
distinguished misappropriation as developed in LN.S. from simply
"copying" design features present in Sears-Compco. " The distinc-
tion is premised on the different degree of competitive advantage
afforded a competitor by the copying specifically allowed by Sears-
Compco and the wholesale appropriation involved in situations
such as "record piracy" cases. There, a sound recording is used as
a master to reproduce copies for sale, permitting the "disklegger"
to bypass the recording costs, performer's royalties and the ex-
pense of promotion while receiving the benefits from the expendi-
tures made by the original recording company. 
'31
The courts which have afforded relief against record piracy on
a common law basis have relied on the basic rationale of I.N.S.
which stated a basic concept of business morality which equalizes
competitors' economic posture. The most interesting aspect of the
record piracy cases is the courts' balancing of preemption with
their abhorrence of the record duplicator's business practices. On
balance, the esoteric notions of federal supremacy in the protection
of published writings have been outweighed by what the courts
viewed as commercial theft.' '
' Stiffel Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 313 F.2d 115 (7th Cir. 1963); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Compco Corporation, 311 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1962).
'n 376 U.S. 225 (1964); 376 U.S. 324 (1964).
' Tape Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D. Cal. 1970),
appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971); Capital Records v. Greatest Records,
43 Misc.2d 878, 252 N.Y.S.2d 553 (1964); Flamingo Telefilm Sales, Inc. v. United
Artists Corp., 141 U.S.P.Q. 461 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 22
App. Div.2d 778, 254 N.Y.S.2d 36 (1964); LibertyUA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp.,
170 U.S.P.Q. 351 (N.C. App. 1971).
'' Tape Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340, 343 (C.D. Cal. 1970)
appeal dismissed, 401 U.S. 902 (1971). See generally, Note, Piracy on Records, 5
STAN. L. REv. 433 (1953).
's E.g., Tape Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Younger, 316 F. Supp. 340 (C.D.Cal.
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The difficulty with rejecting the post-Sears-Compco misap-
propriation cases is that to do so is to place the party who under-
takes the expense of originating a property, such as a sound record-
ing, at a significant disadvantage against a competitor who is able
to capitalize on original recording company's expenditures and
significantly to minimize his own costs. In Sears, Stiffel, the plain-
tiff, had borne the costs of popularizing pole lamps and the initial
design costs. In order to become a competitor Sears had to absorb
the costs of tooling for manufacture. This case is unlike the situa-
tion where a record duplicator's costs are simply the minimal ex-
penses of producing copies from a master sound recording. The
difficulty with misappropriation, amplified by Sears-Compco, is
that it is an encompassing doctrine which could defeat the free
copying federal preemption demands, if not carefully controlled.
The question then becomes: can misappropriation protect any
published writings? Or, does the failure of Congress to expand
copyright protection to a particular class of writings indicate a
Congressional policy to deny protection and permit copying?
In the copyright area it is a precarious business to read intent
from Congressional silence, requiring even more creative interpre-
tative abilities than does interpreting the statute itself.'39 If the
record piracy cases are used as a focal point, an indication is clear
that when Congress wants a class of writings protected it is specifi-
cally stated."' But the corollary is not necessarily correct: silence
1970); Liberty/rA, Inc. v. Eastern Tape Corp., 170 U.S.P.Q. 351 (N.C. App. 1971).
See aLto Grove Press, Inc. v. Collectors Publications, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D.
Cal. 1967); Pottstown Daily News Publishing Co. v. Pottstown Broadcasting Co.,
247 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Bond Buyer v. Dealers Digest Publishing Co.,
149 U.S.P.Q. 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966).
In addition to the protection given to sound recordings under the Copyright Act
of 1976, § 102(a)(7), recordings are also protected under many state statutes.
RECORD INDUSTRY Assoc. OF AMERICA, STATE LAWS AGAINST THE PIRACY OF SOUND
RECORDINGS: A HANDBOOK FOR ENFO.RCEMENT AND PROSECUTION (1976).
"I' Judge Henry J. Friendly has written: "Anyone who has had to deal with the
Copyright Act of 1909 must stand in awe of the ability of the framers to toss off a
sentence that can have any number of meanings." The Gap in Law Making: Judges
Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 787, 793 (1963). The
January 1, 1978, effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976 precludes anything
more than speculation on how the new statute will fare under Judge Friendly's test.
Hopefully, the more than 20 years that went into its consideration will mean less
judicial difficulty in applying the terms of the statute. For an evaluation of the new
statute, as compared to the Copyright Act of 1909, concluding that on balance the
new act is an improvement, see 1 NIMMER, supra note 6, at vii.
110 17 U.S.C. § 101(e) as amended by Publ. L. 92-140 (October 15, 1971) pro.
vided copyright protection for sound recordings on which the sounds constituting
[Vol. 81
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need not mean that Congress intends to prohibit the states from
protecting published writings. This was the approach taken by the
court in Grove Press, Inc., v. Collector's Publications, Inc., 4 where
the plaintiff had set type at substantial cost for reprinting a public
domain work. The defendant photographically prepared printing
plates from the plaintiff's publication to avoid typesetting costs.
Although the plaintiff's version of the public domain work con-
tained insufficient originality to support copyright, the court en-
joined the defendant on the misappropriation theory to prohibit
publication by use of plates produced by photographing the plain-
tiff's reset version. The Grove Press court placed the two publish-
ers on the same economic plane in producing the public domain
work.
Sears-Compco expresses a preference for encouraging copying
of properties within the ambit of the federal statutes unless a fed-
eral monopoly is awarded. Although an early committee report
preceding the passage of the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 specif-
ically equated misappropriation protection with the protection af-
forded by copyright,"' and would have preempted misappropria-
tion, the final draft of the act was not so far reaching. Under the
Copyright Revision Act of 1976, misappropriation is preempted
only to the extent that the protection is "within the general scope
of copyright."" 3 In the case of printed systems which are denied
copyright protection, even stronger reasons support a policy which
prohibits the states from granting protection on the theory of mis-
appropriation.
Even a preliminary inquiry into the complicated reasoning of
Baker v. Selden demonstrates an emphatic insistence that the
constitutional and federal statutory policy precludes a monopoly
of a printed system. To permit an author to sidestep this federal
policy by seeking state protection would defeat the policy encour-
aging use of the printed system; to permit protection for a printed
system on a state-by-state basis is to defeat the free use of the
system. State misappropriation protection is clearly inconsistent
with that distinctly articulated policy against monopoly of printed
systems.
the recording were fixed on or after February 15, 1972, and which carry the required
notice of copyright. The Copyright Act of 1976 § 102(a)(7) continues that protec-
tion.
M 264 F. Supp. 603 (C.D. Cal. 1967).
M H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1967).
1- 17 U.S.C.A. § 301(b)(3) (1976).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Baker v. Selden remains an important copyright authority in
the demarcation of the appropriate limits of copyright protection.
The difficulty with Baker is the Court's approach in treating
printed systems as a distinct type of property and applying a sepa-
rate set of rules to them, including an exaggerated standard of
originality.
The Court's difficulty understanding the protection that could
have been given to printed systems without precluding protection
entirely led to the exclusionary rule discussed in this article. That
rule was to a significant degree a reflection of the then prevailing
idea that copyright protection should not be given to all material
created by original effort but only to material which reflected some
measure of literary quality.
While state protection for printed systems should be pre-
cluded because they are within the subject matter of copyright,
copyright protection should be extended. By evaluating a printed
system under the same standards as, and extending the same scope
of protection to, other works, the excesses of the Baker decision are
neutralized.
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